Showing posts with label japan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label japan. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Axel Merk: Is the Yen Doomed?

In his latest Merk Insight letter, Axel Merk explains the Yen may not be the safe heaven it once was , as the Country has just starting posting current account deficit, which coupled with the stratospheric Japanese debt (>200% of GDP) could see the demise the Yen.

Here's the full analysis:

So many foreign exchange (“FX”) speculators have lost money shorting the yen that the currency earned the nickname the widow maker. Indeed, as the yen has had a weak patch as of late, some are already cautioning the trade might be crowded. But we don’t talk about a trade; we talk about a fundamental shift in the dynamics that might finally be unfolding.

To understand the yen, consider the earthquakes that hit New Zealand and Japan in early 2011: New Zealand’s shaker caused the New Zealand dollar to fall; Japan’s earthquake, in contrast, pushed the yen higher. In the short-term, earthquakes disrupt economic growth; conventional wisdom suggests less growth leads to a weaker currency. However, economic growth and currencies do not correlate as highly as one might expect. Indeed, everything appears backwards in Japan, and there’s a reason: historically, Japan has enjoyed a current account surplus. As a result, Japan does not rely on inflows from abroad to finance its budget deficit. Despite conventional wisdom, note that when there’s a shock to the economy, consumers save more/spend less, a positive to a currency all else being equal (i.e., in the absence of a current account deficit). In contrast, countries like the United States, or New Zealand for that matter, have a current account deficit; in the absence of growth, foreigners are less inclined to invest in the country, potentially depriving the country of inflows needed to finance budget deficits and, in the process, putting downward pressure on the currency. One reason why U.S. policy makers favor growth over austerity is to encourage inflows to finance the deficit. On that note, the lack of growth in the Eurozone, where the current account is roughly in balance, may be bad for employment, but the euro has managed to hold up reasonably well despite the crisis.

In some ways, when a country has a current account surplus, currency dynamics may be counter-intuitive: the more dysfunctional the Japanese government, the stronger the yen appears to have been in recent years. Since 2005, Japan has had seven prime ministers, with another change likely soon. A government with rotating heads suggests a government that doesn’t get anything done. Usually a government that “gets things done” is one that spends money, but Japan could not even get an expeditious rebuilding effort under way after the earthquake struck.

However, Japan's current account has been deteriorating in recent years. Japan is doing its part to accelerate the demise of its current account:
  • With one of the world’s highest life expectancies, almost no net immigration and falling birth rates, Japan’s aging population is often cited as the key-long term driver of the country’s deteriorating current account balance. The Japanese retire later than others in developed countries, cushioning the impact somewhat.
  • The main “achievement” after the earthquake was announcing to abandon nuclear energy. Increasingly relying on imported energy is bad news for Japan's current account balance.
  • Rising tensions with China don't bode we'll for trade. Shinzo Abe, Japan's likely prime minister to be is said to potentially escalate tensions further. If correct, we expect Japan's current account balance to suffer as a result.
Why does this all matter? After all, the US has had a massive current account deficit for years. The size of the current account deficit represents the amount foreigners need to buy in assets (local financial assets or real assets) to keep a currency from falling. With a current account deficit, Japan's debt to GDP ratio of over 200% may suddenly matter, as Japan may need to offer higher rates to attract foreigners to buy local assets (e.g., Japanese government bonds). The trouble is that Japan’s debt might be unsustainable at higher interest rates. To the extent that Japan has a current account surplus, it doesn't matter whether foreigners buy the yen, but those surpluses have fallen to deficits recently and that trend looks set to continue.

Some will argue that it still doesn't matter, as Japan is currently more concerned with negative rates. Our analysis, however, shows that the market does care: in recent years, the yen often appreciated when there was a "flight to safety;" if we use the VIX index, a popular measure of implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, as a proxy for the amount of fear in the market, then the yen should show a high correlation with the index. What the chart shows is that the yen isn't the safe haven it used to be. The yen no longer is the "go to" place when fear is elevated. There might be many reasons for this, but we like to look at it in the context of the current account balance, shown in the previous chart: as the current account has deteriorated, the yen's safe haven status appears to be eroding.

The one thing still going for the yen is that Japanese policy makers often don't execute on their talk. For example, Abe's election rhetoric suggests that the Bank of Japan (BOJ) will lose its independence as the government may force it to increase its inflation target of 1% (which it has failed to achieve) to 2 or 3 percent. But the BOJ has failed over and over again to live up to its promises. A side effect of that is that in recent years the BOJ's balance sheet has barely grown (the BOJ has "printed" very little money as one might colloquially say); Japan did its money printing in the 90s.

However, it may matter little what the BOJ is up to once the current account deteriorates further. We don't look at these trends as academic exercises, but rather consider the risk of acting versus not acting. At this stage, we assess the risk of not acting to be high and are putting our money where our mouth is.

Monday, March 19, 2012

John Embry: Global Debt Saturation Ensures Much Higher Gold & Silver Prices

Presentation by John Embry, Chief Investment Strategist at Sprott Asset Management, at the 2012 California Resource Investment Conference.

 He explains that due to high level of debts and current policies, currency debasements are inevitable and forecasts a complete breakdown of the current monetary system in the US, in Europe, in Japan and possibly in China.  This will likely lead to Gold and Silver prices higher than the most bullish forecasts.

Monday, December 26, 2011

Kyle Bass: Currency Crisis Coming in 3 to 5 Years

Kyle Bass 1 hour interview with AmeriCatalyst 2011 oin November 2011 on his view on the world today. That's very informative, even though it's rather depressing.

Interesting points including:
  • Greece is bankrupt, a full mark down is required
  • Western Economies will fail: Europe first, then Japan, then the USA.
  • Japan has serious debt problems, most people will lose a third of their savings.
  • Investors still don't want to accept reality
  • PE are low, because E is too high and it will come down.
  • We either take pain now, or we take apocalyptic pain later.
  • Central banks will probably just print money and destroy the currencies.
  • The US (government) has the same people who brought up in this mess, to fix the mess. It makes the US a laughing stock.
Click on the link to view. (no embed available)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5V3kpKzd-Yw


Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Axel Merk: Overweight the Japanese Yen

As Greece will hold a referendum whether to approve the austerity measures and the "no" will probably win hands down, Merk Funds recommend over-weighting the Japanese Yen and under-weighting the Euro in the short term.

Here's the the full Merk Insights letter below:
Greek Prime Minister Papandreou is throwing in the towel: by calling for a popular vote on austerity measures now, we believe he is almost assured a no vote. This allows Papandreou to say that he tried everything he could to avoid a default, but the people have spoken. Having said that, as we write this analysis, Papandreou appears to be changing his mind and may cancel the idea of a referendum as quickly as it came about. Still, the message is clear: a default is coming.

The sad part is that Greece has not been able to eliminate its primary deficit (the deficit before interest payments), so that it could have the potential to bounce back upon a default. On the contrary, Greece may fall into chaos or anarchy. The threat of such a scenario, in turn, may prompt European policy makers to instigate a Marshall Plan to rebuild Greece. While we can ponder about the Greek drama, it’s paramount to contemplate the consequences for the rest of Europe and the euro.

First, the good news: market pressures should accelerate reform. Specifically, we expect bank recapitalizations will both be accelerated and increased in scope; if you can’t save the sovereigns, at least make the banking system robust enough to absorb defaults. That’s better than any insurance scheme policy makers can come up with.

Expect dramatic actions by policy makers, akin to those seen in October 2008. Just as policy makers did not initially heed the markets then, the pressure is now on to follow through with substance after last week’s sketchy plan to save Europe, and ostensibly, the world. Specifically, pressure on Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi is mounting rather dramatically to engage in real pension reform. In comparison to both Spain and Ireland, which have seen relative market improvements, the markets have scolded Italy. While it is possible to turn the tide, the longer the wait, the more the market will demand.

What would alleviate the pressure is a commitment by the European Central Bank (ECB) to be the lender of last resort for Italy and Spain. However, that’s unlikely to happen, at least not in the short term. As of today, the ECB has a new leader, Mario Draghi. As an Italian, he will be under pressure to be rather hawkish. His first press conference is this Thursday. He could announce a program to buy unlimited Eurozone debt, and sterilize such activities. However, such a move would take the pressure for reform away. And a central bank’s role is not to make the life of policy makers easy. If Draghi were to pursue the route of least resistance, he could easily be labeled as, well, Italian, in his approach to central banking.

Any revised bailout fund for Italy is likely to cost France its AAA rating. France itself also has lots of homework to do. The lesson here is that policy makers always wait until the last minute to engage in reform; some day down the road, the market will focus on the U.S.; at that stage, the U.S. dollar may be under severe pressure: the U.S. dollar is more vulnerable given the significant current account deficit.

So for now, the drama continues. To summarize, expect more on bank recapitalization and reform. A wild card is whether the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is going to be bolstered in earnest. For those politicians that still believe Greece can be held afloat: stop believing in fairy tails and move on. The market will.

As far as our positioning is concerned, we had increased our euro holdings ahead of the summit last week. We have since reduced it. We had also substantially reduced the yen ahead of that summit. Our outlook calls for substantial volatility in all currencies, except for possibly the yen; as such, our risk assessment is currently favoring the yen disproportionally. As October 2008 has taught us, though, rational investors may be forgiven for changing their view of the world on a daily basis… Stay tuned and subscribe to Merk Insights.

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

U.S. Dollar and Euro - Review and Outlook

Axel Merk & Kieran Osborne, CFA, Merk Funds have just published their outlook for the US dollar, the Euro, the Chinese RMB and several other currencies.

They have a bearish view on the US dollar:
Policy makers in Washington didn’t help appease market concerns: leaving the decision to raise the Government’s debt ceiling to the last minute only exacerbated market fears of a U.S. default and further degraded investor’s view of policy makers; ...Standard & Poors subsequently downgraded the credit rating of the U.S. government, citing the inability of the political leadership to come together and agree on a plan to sustainably rein in the deficit over the long term as a key reason for downgrade. We consider these developments have further eroded the safe haven and reserve currency status the U.S. dollar has held for so long, and continue to view the outlook for the U.S. dollar negatively over the medium to long term.
...
minutes from the FOMC meeting show there was support for further expansionary monetary policy, or quantitative easing, which would constitute “QE3”. It is our assessment that the likelihood of the Fed instigating QE3 has risen significantly, in part due to the weakening economic outlook, but also because of the composition of voting members next year. All three dissenting voices will be replaced in 2012 and the average monetary policy stance of voting members will become much more dovish (only one voting member is considered a hawk – Jeffrey Lacker, the Richmond President)1. With inflation expectations declining, we consider Fed Chairman Bernanke may again present the need for further easing, arguing deflationary risks have become elevated, or at the very least, that further easing will not generate significant inflationary pressures. We believe the impending FOMC composition may consider this argument compelling, and is likely to err on the side of overstimulation. All of which leads us to believe that the outlook for the U.S. dollar remains to the downside.
even if in the short term there are risk, they are bullish on the Euro in the medium to long term:
Europe certainly has problems, but in an odd way, it is the inflexibility of its political make-up that may lead to a stronger euro over the foreseeable future. ...
Many individual countries find themselves with very weak political leadership, but interestingly, have instigated, in many cases, very strict austerity measures with opposition support. The issues facing the Eurozone are significant, and there is no simple, easy solution; it’s likely to be a drawn out process rectifying years of malinvestment brought about by unconscionably low funding rates for periphery nations (Greece could borrow at rates similar to Germany for years leading up to the crisis). In turn, economic growth may be restrained over the foreseeable future. Note, however, that economic growth is not necessarily a precondition for a strong currency; it is not incompatible to have poor economic growth on the back of a strong currency – just look at Japan.
...
We believe two key reasons have contributed to Japanese yen strength – weak leadership and a current account surplus.
...
On the above two factors, the Eurozone is not so dissimilar to Japan: the Eurozone has a broadly balanced current account, fiscal union is disjointed at best, and many individual nations have very weak political leadership. Furthermore, the ECB has a sole mandate of price stability, and is reticent to provide any direct bailout funding or directed asset purchases to the financial industry, or specific sovereigns, for fear of overstepping its bounds (or being taken to court by the Germans).
...
As a result, we consider the euro can appreciate on the backdrop of weaker economic growth and continued divergence in monetary policies
Finally, they mention they still have a positive view of the Chinese Yuan:
We continue to see upside potential in the Chinese renminbi and believe policy makers will continue to be incentivized to allow the currency to appreciate to tackle domestic inflationary pressures.

The full outlook is available at http://www.merkfunds.com/merk-perspective/insights/2011-10-19.html